

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 3/3/86

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 07-08-2009 BY 60324 UCBAW/DK/SBS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (163A-NEW)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (163A-4162) (P) (C-1)

ARROW AIR DC 8-63,
 GANDER, NEW FOUNDLAND,
 DECEMBER 12, 1985;
 FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION -
 GENERAL CRIMINAL MATTERS;
 BUDED: 2/21/86
 (OO: BUREAU)

Re Miami airtel to the Bureau dated 2/12/86.


Enclosed for the Bureau are an original and five copies of a
 self-explanatory LHM captioned as above.

- ② - Bureau (Encs. 6)
 1 - Miami
 HWP/mcq
 (3)

ENCLOSURE

N-131
16-40

On 3/15/86 copy of LHM
 furnished LTC TOM RAUTER
 DIA PENTAGON by Liaison
 9M4



163-56160-1

MAR 10 1986

- 1* -

Approved: *[Signature]*

Transmitted

(Number) (Time)

Per *[Signature]*

1cc & 1 enc 5064

2cc's LHM to Liaison Unit
 1cc's LHM to Liaison Unit
 1cc's LHM to Liaison Unit
 3/1/86 CP


b6
 b7C
 b7D

In this regard, SSA [redacted] Fugitive/General Government Crimes Unit is coordinating a letter response to [redacted] over Mr. Mintz' signature advising of an FPC investigation and referring him to the [redacted] Washington, D.C., for the results of its investigation of the Arrow Air incident.

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b7D

This matter was coordinated with [redacted] Chief, Information and Privacy Acts Litigation Unit, Legal Council Division.

Enclosure



ARROW AIR DC 8-63

[] and several ground support personnel at CIA. [] observed that there would have been no reason to reopen that door at either Cologne or Gander, Newfoundland.. However, he does not know for a fact whether or not the cargo door was reopened prior to the aircraft's departure from Gander, Newfoundland on December 12, 1985.

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3. The engine anti-ice valve on the number one engine, was inoperative when activated on encountering ice while on descent into Cologne, West Germany. [] is not aware of whether [] resolved the problem or tagged it for maintenance. Likewise, he is unaware of whether [] briefed his [] but presumes he did so.

4. It had been noticed that the number four engine was running somewhat hotter than the other three, but was still within limits.

5. Fresh water from the aft lavatories was leaking from the fuselage.

6. [] had noticed during the Cairo to Cologne flight on December 12, 1985, that there was a deficiency in the hydraulic fluid.

On arrival at Cologne, while parked at the gate usually occupied by AA, the number of which [] could not recall, he noticed a mechanic from [] which usually performed the service on the AA, reviewing the log in the cockpit regarding the hydraulic problem. He presumes that the mechanic thereafter added hydraulic fluid to the system.

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There were no other discrepancies known to [] and no other service or maintenance performed on the aircraft on December 11, 1985, other than refueling and restocking the galleys.

In Cologne, the aircraft departed from and landed at the COLOGNE - BONN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (CBIA).

In Cairo, the aircraft landed at CIA and was parked at remote stand, believed to be number nine, the parking space usually occupied by AA aircraft at CIA.

Other than one uniformed soldier carrying a weapon, there was no other visible security at the CIA. All of the ground service on the aircraft was done by Egyptian

ARROW AIR DC 8-63

personnel. He and the other crew members stayed with the aircraft during its stay in Cairo. During that period of time, he noticed 20 or more persons milling about the aircraft with no apparent function in servicing it. At no time in Cairo did he or any other member of the crew become suspicious of any of the individuals milling about the aircraft.

At the CBIA, there was what [] characterized as the usual tight German security, however, there was no special security detail for the AA aircraft.

The conversation between his crew and the crew relieving him, headed by [] was casual. He does recall a comment that they were running heavy. This comment was based upon the fact that he and [] after reviewing the personnel and equipment placed on board, estimated that their weight was slightly higher than on the manifest, but certainly not over maximum gross weight.

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[] had calculated 170 pounds per passenger, and 100 pounds per duffel bag.

As he recalls on the Cairo to Cologne run, they departed with approximately 95,000 pounds to 100,000 pounds of fuel, out of a maximum capacity of 165,800 pounds. While he has no certain knowledge he estimates that the Cologne to Gander flight would have departed with approximately 120,000 pounds of fuel. While the final leg departing Gander would have required no more than 70,000 pounds of fuel.

[] does not recall [] or any member of his crew mentioning any discrepancies or deficiencies on the aircraft, when his crew relieved them early on December 11, 1985, at Cologne.

[] observed that maintenance was never the "strong suit" of AA, but he never observed aircraft flown with major discrepancies effecting the airworthiness of the ship. Maintenance for the AA aircraft were performed by BATCH AIR (BA), of Miami, Florida, which was owned by [] the same individual who owned AA.

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[] feels this arrangement detracted from the maintenance program at AA.

[] has discussed the foregoing with a representative of the Canadian board investigating the accident, both by telephone from Cologne, Germany immediately after the

ARROW AIR DC 8-63

accident and again in person at Miami, Florida, during early February, 1986.

[redacted] provided a copy of a Crew Member Pay and Expense Form, executed by him for flights during December, 1985, as well as a computer time record provided to him by AA, for the period November 16, 1985 through December 15, 1985, copies of which are attached hereto.

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[redacted] furnished the following personal data during the course of interview:

Full Name:	[redacted]
Address:	[redacted]
	[redacted] Florida
Mailing Address:	[redacted]
	[redacted] Florida [redacted]
Telephone Number:	[redacted]
Race:	White
Sex:	Male
Date of Birth:	[redacted]
Height:	5'11" tall
Weight:	190 pounds
Color of Hair:	Brown
Color of Eyes:	Green
Marital Status:	[redacted]
Current Employment:	[redacted]
	[redacted] Florida
Prior Arrests:	None claimed
Military Service:	United States Coast Guard, [redacted] through [redacted] as a non-pilot aircrew member
Serial Number:	[redacted]

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The records of the FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA), Oklahoma City, indicates [redacted] holds an [redacted] He is also a [redacted] and certified mechanic. His Pilot Certificate Number is [redacted] and his Social Security Account Number is listed as [redacted]

b6
b7C

FBI

TRANSMIT-VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
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PRECEDENCE:

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CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
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☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 2/12/86

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 07-08-2009 BY 60324 UCBAW/DK/SBS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (163A-NEW)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (163A-4162) (P) (C-1)

①
 ARROW AIR DC 8-63,
 GANDER, NEW FOUNDLAND,
 DECEMBER 12, 1985;
 FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION -
 GENERAL CRIMINAL MATTERS;
 BUDED 2/21/86
 (OO:BUREAU)

NR 11-7-86 mjb
 Re Bureau letter to Miami 1/21/86.

Enclosed for the Bureau are original and five copies of
 a self explanatory LHM captioned as above.

Enclosed for San Francisco is a [redacted]
 [redacted] letter stating their need and questions necessary for interview
 and Bureau letter dated 1/21/86.

Enclosed for San Francisco is an LHM reflecting investigation
 conducted in Miami.

Enclosed for San Francisco is a Miami Herald newspaper
 article dated 2/5/86 for information.

LEADSSAN FRANCISCO DIVISIONAT SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA

Will contact and interview [redacted]
 [redacted] telephone [redacted] San Francisco should refer to enclosed
 Bureau letter when submitting results of interview.

- ENCLOSURE
 ② - Bureau (Encs. 6)
 1 - San Francisco (Encs. 4)
 3 - Miami
 HWP/mcq
 (6)

2 FEB 19 1986

Approved: [Signature]

Transmitted

(Number) (Time)

Per [Signature]

1 cc + 1 encl 5064
 1 encl D

64

b6
 b7C
 b7D

MM 163A-4162

MIAMI DIVISION:

AT [] FLORIDA

Review enclosed Bureau letter and [] letter. Thereafter,
contact and interview []
[] telephone [] and submit according to
guidelines set forth.

b6
b7C
b7D

AT [] FLORIDA

Conduct same investigation as set forth in [] lead
for [] telephone []



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

February 12, 1986
Miami, Florida

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-08-2009 BY 60324 UCBAW/DK/SBS

RE: ARROW AIR DC 8-63
GANDER, NEW FOUNDLAND,
DECEMBER 12, 1985;
FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION

On January 31, 1986, a Special Agent (SA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) contacted and interviewed [redacted] [redacted] ARROW AIR, 7955 N.W. 12th Street, Fourth Floor, Miami, Florida, telephone [redacted] [redacted] made available the names and addresses of the following ARROW AIR flight crew:

[redacted]
[redacted] Florida [redacted]
Telephone Number: [redacted]

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[redacted]
[redacted] Florida [redacted]
Telephone Number: [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] California [redacted]
Telephone Number: [redacted]

[redacted] stated he was willing to cooperate in any matter necessary and advised that all of the members of the flight crew had [redacted]
[redacted]

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

163 - 56160 - 2
ENCLOSURE

FBI/DOJ

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
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PRECEDENCE:

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☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 3/3/86

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 07-08-2009 BY 60324 UCBAW/DK/SBS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (163A-NEW)
 (ATTENTION: FUGITIVE/GENERAL GOVERNMENT CRIMES UNIT,
 CID, FBIHQ)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (163A-4162) (RUC)

ARROW AIR DC 8-63,
 GANDER, NEWFOUNDLAND,
 DECEMBER 12, 1985;
 FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION -
 GENERAL CRIMINAL MATTERS;
 BUDED: 2/21/86
 (OO: BUREAU)

Re Miami airtel to the Bureau 2/12/86.

Enclosed to the Bureau are the original and five
 copies of an LHM suitable for dissemination to the [redacted] through
 Legat, Ottawa.

The SA mentioned in enclosed LHM was SA [redacted]
 [redacted] Homestead RA.

on 3/19/86 LHM
 furnished LTR [redacted]
 DIA Pentagon by Liaison 3mm

ENCLOSURE

- ③ - Bureau (Enc. 6)
 (2 - Legat, Ottawa)
 1 - Miami [redacted]
 WPS:mcb
 (4)

1*

12 MAR 10 1986

Approved: Juc/yep

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Miami, Florida
March 3, 1986

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 07-08-2009 BY 60324 UCBAW/DK/SBS

ARROW AIR DC 8-63
GANDER, NEWFOUNDLAND
DECEMBER 12, 1985

[redacted] employed by ARROW
AIR, residing at [redacted]
Florida, home telephone [redacted], was interviewed by
a Special Agent of the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)
on February 22, 1986, and he gave essentially the following
information:

I. Concerning the condition of the ARROW AIR DC8-63,
tail number N950JW, during its round trip from Cologne, West
Germany to Cairo, Egypt, and return, during the period
December 11-12, 1986, [redacted] noted only five
items that could have indicated potential operational problems
but were not considered to be sufficiently significant to
justify grounding the aircraft.

First, the incoming crew who turned the aircraft
over to him in Cologne on December 11, 1985, advised him of
an overburn of fuel in the amount of 3,000 to 4,000 pounds
during their incoming trip. Fuel overburns result from such
things as overweight, control surfaces (flaps) not streamlined,
leaking door seals, and headwinds. He did not fly overweight
in either direction. He experienced the same amount of over-
burn during his round trip; it remained constant during both
legs of the trip. He considered this as insignificant because
it amounted to only 4 percent to 4.5 percent of the fuel load,
and it remained constant.

163- 56160-2X

ENCLOSURE

ARROW AIR DC 8-63, GANDER NEWFOUNDLAND, DECEMBER 12, 1985

Second, during pre-flight operations while taxiing the aircraft toward take-off at Cologne, he felt a soft ratcheting of the elevator control during its last inch of forward travel. "It felt like a soft strumming of four of your fingers against a finger of your other hand," he said. He stopped the aircraft and performed this operation again. The [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] then advised him that this problem with this aircraft had been written up previously, and WORLD AIRWAYS, Oakland, California, had checked it out thoroughly. ARROW AIR's European Manager of Operations was in the cockpit at that time and he told [REDACTED] to have a mechanic look into this matter upon return of this aircraft to Cologne on December 12, 1985. Later, during the return flight from Cairo to Cologne, the captain reminded the flight engineer to have a mechanic at Cologne examine the tail compartment.

Third, [REDACTED] noticed that this aircraft climbed slowly, but he added that this is "not too unusual" for this type aircraft. "It is not a high performance aircraft," he said. The climb rate was constant on both legs of the trip. There was no problem with the flow of fuel to the engines or any other discerned problem that may have contributed to the slowness of the climb rate. He thought no more about it because this aircraft appeared to be operating normally.

Fourth, the right outboard engine (the number four engine) was old and was scheduled to be replaced with a new one after the Cologne-Newfoundland-Kentucky trip. WORLD AIRWAYS, Oakland, California, already had the new engine and would have installed it if the aircraft had not crashed. The only discernable problem with the old engine was that its exhaust gas temperature was 15°-20° higher than the other three engines while in flight. This was not significant in [REDACTED] opinion. However, after take-off from Cairo on the return leg of the trip, the flight engineer told him that during take-off, the temperature differential had been 50° and because of that, the flight engineer had pulled back the number four engine throttle slightly, to reduce this temperature. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not report this problem, because he knew the old engine was soon to be replaced, and the 15°-20° difference was insignificant. Furthermore, all commercial airline pilots are highly trained and skilled in the procedures to be performed instantly upon loss of an engine during take-off and flight.

Fifth, while en route from Cairo to Cologne on December 11, 1985, [] noticed that the hydraulic fluid instrument in the cockpit indicated that the reservoir was slightly less than full. He believes that he wrote it up after arrival at Cologne on December 12, 1985. He estimated that four quarts of hydraulic fluid should have been added to the reservoir in Cologne. He said that the hydraulic pressure was normal during both legs of his trip, therefore, no leak of fluid was indicated. He considered the four quarts to be an insignificant amount, because the reservoir holds 20 quarts, and the entire system holds 40 gallons.

II. Concerning his actual flight schedules of his Cologne-Cairo-Cologne round trip on December 11 - 12, 1985, [] recorded the exact times, in Greenwich Mean Time (ZULU), that he released the brakes and set the brakes at those cities. The times were as follows:

Cologne 1050Z, December 11, 1985
Cairo 1534Z, December 11, 1985
Cairo 2035Z, December 11, 1985
Cologne 0121Z, December 12, 1985

[] observed that the crew was rested, clean and not rushed at the beginning of both legs of his flight. Further, he commented that he and his crew flew this same aircraft on the same round trip on December 4, 1985, and those flight times were recorded, in like manner, as follows:

Cologne 0047Z, December 4, 1985
Cairo 0512Z, December 4, 1985
Cairo 1130Z, December 4, 1985
Cologne 1625Z, December 4, 1985

III. Concerning the two airports, the Cologne airport is used by civilian traffic, but the Cairo airport is for both civilian and military traffic. In Cairo, there were large numbers of both Egyptian and Russian military aircraft which were parked in the military area of the airport. The designated military area was 400 yards from [] assigned parking place in the civilian area. There is no fence between the civilian and military area, but they are separated from one another by runway 16/34. On December 11, 1985, he parked his aircraft on the north side of the terminal building, in parking space number 7, facing northwest.

ARROW AIR DC 8-63, GANDER NEWFOUNDLAND, DECEMBER 12, 1985

IV. Concerning maintenance and servicing of the aircraft during his flight period, [] reiterated his previous statement about the fluid level in the hydraulic fluid reservoir. There was no other maintenance or service required or performed. He added, however, that he knew that between his trips of December 4, 1985 and December 11, 1985 in this aircraft, "a couple of starters had been changed by WORLD AIRWAYS in California." He experienced no problem with any of the starters during his December 11-12, 1985 trip.

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V. Regarding security of the aircraft, [] said that in Cairo, one Egyptian Army guard was assigned on the ground beneath the aircraft, and two U.S. soldiers were assigned on board the aircraft. He noticed, however, that the Egyptian disappeared from his post several times, sometimes for as long as an hour. Also, [] noticed that the Egyptian baggage workers got into a fist fight outside the aircraft during the loading procedure. He thought this was an extremely unusual event, because, in his experience and in view of certain of their religious beliefs, Arabs seldom touch each other. However, no damage was done to the aircraft or its cargo, and he gave no further thought to the incident.

In Cologne, however, on December 12, 1985, no guard was posted on the ground outside the aircraft. Furthermore, the "B" cargo compartment in the belly of the aircraft was left open during the night. LUFTHANSA caters the food served on this aircraft, and the frozen food that is to be used later in the flight is stored in the "B" compartment. The door of "B" belly is directly beneath the leading edge of the right wing. [] observed that the Cologne airport is fully fenced in, but general airport security is considerably less stringent than, for example, Frankfurt airport which is just a few miles away from Cologne. He did not know whether two U.S. soldiers were left on board on guard duty at Cologne, as they had been in Cairo.

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VI. Concerning information given to him by the other crew, [] was told on December 11, 1985 by [] in Cologne prior to the trip to Cairo, about the fuel overburn in the amount of 3,000 to 4,000 pounds, and [] remained aware of this information throughout his trip to Cairo and return. However, as mentioned previously, he noted that the overburn remained constant and he discounted its significance.

Upon his return to Cologne, [] advised [] that the right Omega (a navigational instrument) wandered during the final approach into Cologne. Even though he considered this to be insignificant, he nevertheless mentioned it to []. He said it "just lost its memory" and simply needed to be reset. It does not control the aircraft; it only provides information. He did not mention the hydraulic fluid to anyone because he considered it to be insignificant and he knew that the flight engineer was having it checked.

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VII. In addition to his answers to the preceding six specific questions, [] volunteered the following comments:

A. Virtually every aircraft in existence has Deferred Maintenance Items (DMI). In 35 years, he has flown only one aircraft that had no DMI. He has flown aircraft with as many as 20 DMI. DMI's demand judgment calls of each captain, all of whom must check maintenance logs before flights and judge whether to fly, whether to have any DMI repaired before flight, or whether to consider them insignificant to the flight being planned at the moment.

B. Regarding an alleged DMI concerning a de-icing valve on N950JW, he does not remember such a DMI. There are three icing valves on each engine, each with a different function. Also, there are warning lights in the cockpit to alert the crew if any of the valves are not working.

C. Regarding an alleged problem with instruments that control the plane's ability to climb, descend and turn, he said that instrument is called a Gyro Horizon. There are three of these in a DC-8, each with a different source of electric power. One of them, for example, has a Honda battery so that it will continue to function in case all electric power throughout the aircraft fails. When any one of these Gyro Horizons fail, a warning flag appears as a signal to the crew to not respect information that it is giving.

D. The Army colonel in charge of the troops aboard N950JW on December 11, 1985 did not hold a baggage inspection and commented to [] in Cairo, "I don't know what these men have in their baggage. It could be anything from hand grenades to night vision scopes to classified equipment - who knows?" There were 41 duffel bags left behind in Cairo, because the cargo bays were full. Baggage had been left unguarded in two semitrailers overnight in Cairo.

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ARROW AIR DC 8-63, GANDER NEWFOUNDLAND, DECEMBER 12, 1985

E. The December 11-12 flight of N950JW was not overloaded on any leg of its flight. The weight of passengers and baggage on board fell within normal limits for this aircraft established by the FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY (FAA). In fact, the gross weight of this aircraft was greatest when it departed Cologne, en route to Gander, Newfoundland. The fuel weights during the fatal flight were as follows:

86,000 pounds out of Cairo
119,000 pounds out of Cologne
101,000 pounds out of Gander

F. Jet engines function better in lower temperatures. The temperatures at take-off times of the fatal flight were as follows:

+ 15°C at Cairo
+ 6°C at Cologne
0°C at Gander

G. Six empty food transporters were taken out of "B" belly in Cologne and presumably, were replaced with full ones by LUFTHANSA catering service for the Cologne-Gander leg. These food transporters are never searched.

H. [redacted] flying experience includes [redacted] flying for AIRLIFT INTERNATIONAL and [redacted] flying for ARROW AIR. He has flown various legs of the trip described as Cairo-Cologne-Gander-Kentucky and other destinations 20 times. He also served in the U.S. Navy.

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I. [redacted] theorized that the crash of N950JW at Gander was caused by either structural failure of the aircraft on take-off, or explosion of a bomb that may have been placed in the aircraft in Cologne on December 12, 1985. He said that in his opinion, the loss of the number four engine would not have caused the crash. He added that he believes that the right wing "stalled" causing the nose to rise and the aircraft to roll onto its right side. This action would cause the aircraft to veer to its right and begin immediate descent. If the "stall" were not corrected by the crew, the aircraft would crash and skid on the ground toward its left. It is his understanding that this is precisely what happened to N950JW. He further theorized that the force of an explosion of a bomb in "B" belly could have "Kicked up the slightly lowered flaps on the right wing," causing the wing to stall.

ARROW AIR DC 8-63, GANDER NEWFOUNDLAND, DECEMBER 12, 1985


J. In conclusion, [REDACTED] made available a sketch of his theory described above, and also three pages from his pilots airport guide book, demonstrating the places N950JW parked in Cairo and Cologne on December 11 and 12, 1985, and his understanding of the crash site at Gander. These pages are as follows:

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CAIRO, EGYPT, A.R.
CAIRO INTL

20 SEP 85


10-5A

Eff 26 Sep**JEPPESEN**

TAXI
COLOGNE-BONN, GER. (FRG)
COLOGNE-BONN

(10-5 A) 23 SEP 83

JEPPESSEN



CHANGES: See other side.

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GANDER, NFLD.

CYQX

(11-1) MAY 4-84

JEPPESEN

GANDER INT'L


N48 56.4 W054 34.2 357.2°/2.8 From YQX 112.7

Elev 496' Var 26°W

GANDER Ground 121.9
Tower 118.1GANDER Departure (R)
128.5

VOT 114.8

NOTE: Airport of entry.



ADDITIONAL RUNWAY INFORMATION

RWY			USABLE LENGTHS		TAKE-OFF	WIDTH
			LANDING BEYOND Threshold	Glide Slope		
04	HIRL HIALS	RVR		9300'	10,200'	200'
22	HIRL ALS REIL ② VASI-L (3 bar)		10,200'			
09	HIRL		3200'		3200'	200'
27	HIRL ALS					
13	HIRL HIALS	RVR		7899'		200'
31	HIRL ALS REIL ② VASI-L (3 bar)					

① Limited to 42,000 lbs. Usable days only.

② Upwind angle 3.0°, downwind angle 2.75°.

TAKE-OFF

All Rwy's

1 & 2
EngLanding Minimums Apply.
Use Ceiling (HAT/HAA Equivalent) & Vis
of Rwy to be Used in Event of Return.

FOR FILING AS ALTERNATE

Precision

Non-Precision

A
B
C
D

600-2

800-2

700-2


RVR 16 or 1/4 authorized for AY, EA, FT, LY, OA, PAA, TW, KU.

CHANGES: See other side.

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11*

RT FLAP
(INBOARD FOOTB)
SEGMENT



FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile

☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 3/25/86

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 (ATTN: FUGITIVE/GENERAL GOVERNMENT CRIMES UNIT, CID, FBIHQ)

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (163A-2554) (RUC) (SJRA)

SUBJECT: ARROW AIR
 DC8-63,
 Gander, Newfoundland,
 DECEMBER 12, 1985;
 FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION,
 GENERAL CRIMINAL MATTERS;
 BUDED: PAST
 (OO:BUREAU)

Re Miami airtel to the Bureau, 2/12/86.

Enclosed for the Bureau is the original and five copies of an LHM setting forth results of investigation conducted by Special Agent [redacted] at San Jose, California, concerning captioned matter. It should be noted that considerable difficulty was experienced in contacting Arrow Air [redacted] at his residence in [redacted] California as his employment keeps him out of the area for extended periods of time. Additionally, immediately after such interview was conducted with [redacted] at [redacted] California, the reporting agent in this matter was sickened with the flu, and this matter is being reported at the earliest possible date. [redacted] readily agreed that the information as furnished by him may be disseminated to a friendly foreign government.

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (Encls. 6)
 1 - San Francisco (163A-2554)
 DJS/mas
 (3)

12 MAR 31 1986

2 cc's sent to [redacted] Div 5
 for dissemination to DIA 4/1/86

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
 (Number) (Time)



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Francisco, California

March 25, 1986

ARROW AIR
DC8-63,
Gander, Newfoundland,
DECEMBER 12, 1985;

[redacted] California, advised on March 3, 1986 that he was the [redacted] aboard Arrow Airlines DC8, registration no. N950JW, when the plane was flown from Cologne, West Germany to Cairo, Egypt on December 11, 1985, and subsequently returned to Cologne, West Germany on December 12, 1985. Shortly after its arrival at Cologne, West Germany the responsibility for the plane was turned over to the crew who thereafter died in the fatal crash of the airplane at Gander, Newfoundland on December 12, 1985. [redacted] stated that the airplane was, at the time of his flight from Cologne to Cairo and return to Cologne, operating in a basically adequate manner. In [redacted] opinion, the airplane was operating acceptably and approximately the same way it had been for two months prior to the crash. The plane had previous problems, but [redacted] log book indicates that these problems had been fixed at the Oakland, California Airport by World Airways Service Department. Because of the delay experienced when the plane was being fixed by World Airlines in Oakland, California it was running a day late of the original schedule.

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[redacted] stated that while assigned as the Flight Engineer of the crew assigned to this airplane just prior to the crash, they left Cologne, West Germany at 10:50 a.m. (Zulu time) on December 11, 1985, arriving in Cairo, Egypt at 15:34 (Zulu time) on December 11, 1985. That they then departed Cairo, Egypt at 20:35 hours (Zulu time) on December 11, 1985, and arrived back in Cologne, West Germany at 1:21 (Zulu time) on December 12, 1985. During this trip [redacted] noted that the no. 4 engine was running approximately forty degrees hot, but stated that this is not considered to be a major problem and nothing else having to do with the operating efficiency of the plane appeared to be in any way defective.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

103-56160
1 -
ENCLOSURE

ARROW AIR
DC8-63,
Gender Newfoundland;
DECEMBER 12, 1985
FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION;
GENERAL CRIMINAL MATTERS

[] stated that both the Cologne, West Germany and Cairo, Egypt International Airports are both commercial airports.

[] stated that the airplane required no maintenance or servicing during the period that he was assigned as part of the crew. He stated that the stops at Cologne and Cairo International Airports were for the purpose of refueling, crew changes, and passenger changes. [] stated that at both Cologne and Cairo International Airports the military company commander assigned three or four military men to stand by and act as guards to ensure security of the plane at both locations.

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[] stated that the military personnel which were aboard the airplane in the flight from Cologne, West Germany got off the airplane at Cairo, Egypt, and [] the airplane's co-pilot, as well as all of the flight attendants, supervised the Egyptian crews who were assigned to off-loading the plane's cargo area. [] stated that it was normal to have Egyptian personnel do the off-loading of the planes pursuant to an agreement between the Egyptians and one United States Major Carpenter, the liaison officer at the Airport between the United States and Egyptian Governments. [] characterized the security of the airplane at Cologne, West Germany as "good;" whereas the security of the airplane at Cairo, Egypt he classified as being "standard," although he added that he saw nothing out of the ordinary at either the West German or Egyptian Airports. [] could not recall either receiving any pertinent information from the previous crew of the airplane, nor the giving of any pertinent information to the crew which relieved the crew of which he was a member.

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In conclusion, [] stated that all of the above information had been given by him to a Canadian National Transportation and Safety Board Agent who had telephonically made contact with both himself and [] within days of the crash of the airplane and had interviewed both [] and [] for approximately one hour each. [] could furnish no additional information at this time.

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b7C

Hughes Hubbard & Reed
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20004

TELEPHONE: 202-626-6200
TELECOPIER: 202-347-1781
TELEX: 892674

ONE WALL STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10005
212-709-7000


555 SOUTH FLOWER STREET
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90071
213-489-5140

47, AVENUE GEORGES MANDEL
75116 PARIS, FRANCE
4-553-9901

April 4, 1986

OUTSIDE SOURCE

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R

Mr. Floyd Clark
Assistant Director for Criminal Investigations
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Tenth and Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Clark:

Φ
The undersigned represents Arrow Air, Inc., in the litigation arising out of the December 12, 1985, crash of an Arrow DC-8 aircraft at Gander, Newfoundland, Canada.


Following the accident it was brought to our attention that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) may have been involved in some sort of investigatory activities relative to the accident. In this regard, we would appreciate receiving, if possible, any information relative to the nature and scope of the FBI's investigation of either the accident or surrounding circumstances. *Mac*

33 DE-149 *163-56160-4*
In connection with the foregoing if I can provide any additional information, please do not hesitate to call me at the above-referenced number. I very much appreciate your cooperation.

Very truly yours, APR 21 1986

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12/8
NO ACK per 4/11/86
MINTZ etc to 

64 SEP 9 1986

FORMS.TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

INBOX.11 (#4380)

TEXT:
VZCZWFO 022

RR HQ MM

DEWFO 022 0942120

ZNR UUUUU

R 04 2000Z APR 86

FM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (47-0)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: SSA [REDACTED] FUGITIVE AND GOVERNMENT
CRIMES UNIT, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION) ROUTINE
SAC, MIAMI ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

① Arrow Air

FL

UNSUBS: POSSIBLE IMPERSONATION OF FBI SPECIAL AGENTS: ARROW

AIRLINES- VICTIM, OO:MIAMI.

TITLE CHANGED TO REFLECT MIAMI AS OFFICE OF ORIGIN.

FOR INFORMATION OF MIAMI, ON 4/1/86, WFO CONTACTED [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ATTORNEY, HUGHES, HUSBAND, REED,

SUITE 300, 1201 PENN. AVENUE, N.W., WDC, AT THE DIRECTION OF FBIHQ.

[REDACTED] HAD EARLIER CONTACTED THE BUREAU AND REQUESTED TO BE
INFORMED IF THE BUREAU HAD AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION REGARDING
ARROW AIRLINES. FURTHER, HE ADVISED THAT HIS OFFICE HAD BEEN
ADVISED BY AIRLINE PERSONNEL THAT THEY HAD BEEN QUESTIONED BY
INDIVIDUALS, WHO IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS FBI AGENTS. [REDACTED]

DEC 12 1986

In sure mri has
all previous communications
immediate attention
I have let go in the
last 1/2 yr. Follow closely get
with attorney.

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Servs.	FC
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

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KOR

163-56160-5

APR 15 1986

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DEC 12 1986

PAGE TWO DE WF 0022 UNCLAS

QUESTIONED WHETHER THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE IN FACT FBI AGENTS.

[] WAS ADVISED THAT WFO KNEW OF NO INFORMATION REGARDING ANY INVESTIGATION OF ARROW AIRLINES. [] WAS DIRECTED TO CONTACT THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CID, REGARDING INFORMATION CONCERNING OTHER FBI FIELD OFFICES.

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ON 4/4/86, [] RECONTACTED WFO AND PROVIDED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. HE STATED THAT AT LEAST THREE PILOTS FOR ARROW AIRLINES HAD REPORTEDLY BEEN INTERVIEWED IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, BY INDIVIDUALS WHO IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS FBI AGENTS. THESE INTERVIEWS OCCURRED IN JANUARY OR FEBRUARY, 1986. INTERVIEWED WERE (X) (FNU) [] ARROW AIRLINES, (X) (FNU) [] (X) (FNU) [] ARROW AIRLINES. THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE QUESTIONED REGARDING ACCESS TO CARGO AREAS, INFORMATION REGARDING ANY EXPLOSIVES ABOARD AIRCRAFT AND AIRCRAFT HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS.

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IN ADDITION, [] STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, WHICH HAS INFORMED ARROW AIRLINES THAT AFTER THE CRASH OF THEIR MILITARY CHARTER FLIGHT IN CANADA, NTSB RECEIVED NUMEROUS REPORTS OF EXPLOSIVES BEING CARRIED ABOARD THIS AIRCRAFT. THESE REPORTS WERE ALL 'REPOREDLY REFERRED TO THE FBI.

PAGE THREE DE WF 0022 UNCLAS

[] STATED THAT HE HAD NO ADDITIONAL DETAILS REGARDING THIS MATTER. HE ADVISED IN THE NEAR FUTURE HE WILL BE TRAVELING TO OTTAWA, CANADA, WHERE HE WILL MEET WITH [] AND []. AT THAT TIME, HE WILL OBTAIN THEIR FIRST NAMES AND APPROPRIATE ADDRESSES. THIS INFORMATION WILL THEN BE FURNISHED TO WFO. UPON RECEIPT OF THIS INFORMATION, WFO WILL ADVISE THE BUREAU AND MIAMI.

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LEADS. MIAMI. AT MIAMI, FLORIDA. (1) WILL CONDUCT INDICES CHECK ON (FNU) [] (FNU) [] AND (FNU) []

(2) WILL ADVISE THE BUREAU OF ANY INVESTIGATION CURRENTLY UNDERWAY OR HAVING BEEN CONDUCTED REGARDING ARROW AIRLINES.

MIAMI SHOULD NOTE THAT WFO WAS INSTRUCTED TO PROVIDE REQUESTED INFORMATION TO THE BUREAU BY 4/8/86.

BT

#0022

NNNN

FORMS.TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

INBOX.4 (#4785)

TEXT:

MMO 0001 0971542

OO HQ WFO

DE MM

O 071532Z APR 86

FM MIAMI (47-NEW) (C-2) (C)

TO DIRECTOR IMMEDIATE

(ATTENTION: SSA [REDACTED] FUGITIVE AND GOVERNMENT CRIMES
UNIT)

WFO (47-0) IMMEDIATE

BT

UNCLAS

UNSUBS; POSSIBLE IMPERSONATION OF FBI SPECIAL AGENTS; ARROW AIRLINES -
VICTIM; OO: MIAMI

RE WFO TELETYPE TO BUREAU, DATED APRIL 4, 1986.

FOR INFORMATION BUREAU AND WFO, NO REFERENCES IDENTIFIABLE
LOCATED FOR (FNU)'S [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED] HOWEVER,
REFERENCE TO [REDACTED] LOCATED AND REVEALED FOLLOWING:

[REDACTED] ARROW AIRLINES, INTERVIEWED
FEBRUARY 20, 1986, CONCERNING CASE ENTITLED, "ARROW AIR DC8-63, GANDER,
NEW FOUNDLAND, DECEMBER 12, 1985; FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION - GENERAL
CRIMINAL MATTER; BUDED; FEBRUARY 21, 1986; (OO: BUREAU)."

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong.	
Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
7 APR 86 1717
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

4245

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-08-2009 BY 60324 UCBAW/DK/SBS

all sus

KCN

163-56160-6

APR 16 1986

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6 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DEC 23

206

D7

12:30P

MJB
OVER

PAGE TWO MM 47-NEW UNCLAS

DETAILS OF INTERVIEW CONDUCTED BY MIAMI CONTAINED IN LHM, DATED
FEBRUARY 20, 1986, ENCLOSED WITH MIAMI AIRTEL TO DIRECTOR, DATED
MARCH 3, 1986, ¹⁶³⁻⁵⁶¹⁶⁰⁻¹ UNDER MIAMI FILE 163A-4162, BUREAU FILE 163A-NEW.

ALSO, PRIOR COMMUNICATION ENCLOSED INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] AT [REDACTED] FLORIDA, FEBRUARY 22, 1986, AND OTHERS.

BT

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FORMS.TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

FILES.INCOMING.DAY1-7.947 (#37112) RECEIVED

TEXT: VZCZCWF0006

RR HQ

DE WF0006 092 0345

ZNR UUUUU

R 020345Z APR 86

FROM SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (47-0)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI ROUTINE

ATTN: FUGITIVE AND GOVERNMENT CRIMES UNIT, CID

BT

UNCLAS

① ARROW AIR

UNSUBS; POSSIBLE IMPERSONATION OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT ARROW

AIRLINES-VICTIM; 00:WFO

ON 4/1/86 (X) [REDACTED] ATTORNEY, HUGHES, HUSBAND,
REED, SUITE 300, 1201 PENNA. AVE., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C.
WAS CONTACTED BY WFO REGARDING INFORMATION HE PROVIDED TO
THE BUREAU INDICATING INDIVIDUALS MAY HAVE IMPERSONATED FBI
AGENTS IN CONTACTING ARROW AIRLINE EMPLOYEES. [REDACTED] STATED
THAT THIS FIRM REPRESENTS ARROW AIRLINES AND IS INVOLVED IN
LITIGATION REGARDING THE MILITARY CHARTERED ARROW AIRLINE
PLANE THAT CRASHED IN CANADA. [REDACTED] STATED THAT HE HAD
RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT FBI AGENTS WERE QUESTIONING ARROW

Exec. AD-Adm.	
Exec. AD-Inv.	
Exec. AD-LES	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	1/27
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.	
Rec. Mgmt.	
Tech. Servs.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

ESD

10118

APR 16 1986

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DEC 12 1986 RLM

47 JUL 13 1996

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QUER

6- [REDACTED] Hant wfo
recontact on 4/8 for further info sent and finalized this.

PAGE TWO DE WF 0006 U N C L A S

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EMPLOYEES REGARDING HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS ON ARROW'S PLANES.

[REDACTED] REQUESTED ANY INFORMATION REGARDING ANY POSSIBLE
FBI INVESTIGATION.

[REDACTED] WAS ADVISED THAT THERE IS NO INVESTIGATION
UNDERWAY BY THE WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE REGARDING THE ARROW
AIRLINE CRASH. HE WAS FURTHER ADVISED THAT HE SHOULD DIRECT
ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING FBI INVESTIGATIONS OF ARROW AIRLINES
TO THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISIONS,
FBIHQ, IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF ANY ACTIVE INVESTIGATION
REGARDING ARROW AIRLINES IS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN ANY OTHER
FIELD OFFICE.

[REDACTED] WAS ALSO ADVISED THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION WOULD MOST LIKELY CONDUCT ANY INVESTIGATION
OF AN AIRLINES CRASH. HE WAS ALSO ADVISED THAT THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION DOES EMPLOY SPECIAL AGENTS AND THAT THERE
MAY BE SOME CONFUSION REGARDING THIS MATTER.

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[REDACTED] INDICATED HIS INFORMATION WAS THIRD AND FOURTH
HAND AND THAT HE IS NOT SURE IF THESE INVESTIGATIONS DID ACTUALLY
REPRESENT THEMSELVES AS FBI AGENTS. HE INDICATED THAT HE
WOULD RECONTACT HIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION TO DETERMINE IF

PAGE THREE DE WF 0006 U N C L A S

THE INVESTIGATORS DID ACTUALLY REPRESENT THEMSELVES AS FBI AGENTS. [REDACTED] WILL RECONTACT WFO IF HE SUSPECTS THAT ANY INDIVIDUAL ATTEMPTED TO IMPERSONATE A FEDERAL AGENT.

WFO TAKING NO FURTHER ACTION.

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4/9/86

UNSUBS;
POSSIBLE IMPERSONATION OF
~~FBI SPECIAL AGENTS~~
~~ARROW AIRLINES - VICTIM~~
OO: MIAMI

ARROW AIR
DC8-63,
GANDER, NEWFOUNDLAND,
DECEMBER 12, 1985;
FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION,
GENERAL CRIMINAL MATTERS;

CLARKE.
Floyd:

The following is in response to Mr. Mintz' inquiry of 3/31/86 concerning the above-captioned possible impersonation matter:

On 4/1/86 and 4/4/86, the Washington Field Office contacted Attorney [redacted] who advised that an Arrow Air Flight crew reportedly had been interviewed by FBI Agents in Miami, Florida, relative to its fatal crash of DC8-63 at Gander, Newfoundland, on 12/12/85.

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Based upon this information, it has been determined that the FBI did conduct a Foreign Police Cooperation (FPC) investigation in this matter pursuant to a [redacted] to the Director, dated 12/31/85 (copy attached).

On 1/31/86, [redacted] Arrow Air, Miami, Florida, made available the names of a flight crew who could advise of the condition of DC8-63 during its round trip from Cologne, West Germany, to Cairo, Egypt, and return, during the period 12/11-12/85.

Subsequently, the Miami and San Francisco Divisions interviewed [redacted] and [redacted]. The final results of our investigation have been disseminated by LHM to the [redacted] Washington, D.C., and the Defense Intelligence Agency via liaison.

JUL 15 1986

OCT 08 1986

ENCLOSURE

64 JAN 16 1987

File

95-271189



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Miami, Florida
February 20, 1986

ARROW AIR DC 8-63,
GANDER, NEW FOUNDLAND,
DECEMBER 12, 1985;
FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION -
GENERAL CRIMINAL MATTERS

[redacted] Florida, telephone number [redacted] voluntarily
appeared at the Fort Lauderdale, Florida Office of the FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI).

After having been advised of the identity of the
interviewing official and the nature of the inquiry, he
furnished the following information:

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During December, 1985, he was employed by ARROW AIR (AA),
Miami, Florida, as a [redacted] aboard a DC 8 aircraft owned
by that company, United States Registration 950 JW.

On December 11, 1985, he was the [redacted] on that
aircraft on two flights, the first departing Cologne, West
Germany, at 1050 Greenwich mean time, arriving at Cairo, Egypt,
at 1534 Greenwich mean time. The second flight was from
Cairo to Cologne, departing Cairo at 2035 Greenwich mean time,
arriving at Cologne at 0121 Greenwich mean time.

The only discrepancies on the aircraft that he was
aware of during the course of those two flights were as follows:

1. The true air speed entry function on the Omega
navigation system was inoperative.
2. The forward main cargo door had been tagged for
deferred maintenance and had a sign affixed, "Do not open";
however, because of the amount of baggage on the Cairo to
Cologne leg, the forward main cargo door was in fact open.
The malfunction in the door which had caused it to be tagged
concerned the counterweight pulley system. This meant that
additional human muscle power was needed to secure the door,
but after the cargo hold had been filled the door was in
fact closed and properly secured. The door was secured at
CAIRO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (CIA), by himself, [redacted]

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163-56160-1
ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-08-2009 BY 60324 UCBAW/DK/SBS